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INTRODUCTION
Copyright deals with both property and speech in a unique
way. As a property regime, copyright gives authors a bundle of
rights, regulating what they can and cannot do with their works.1
These rights include the right to reproduce, distribute, perform, and
display the copyrighted work, as well as the right to create
derivative works.2 Like ordinary property owners, copyright
owners enjoy exclusive rights over their works. Others cannot
reproduce or distribute the work without the owner’s permission.3
Although copyright applies to intangible property, the rights of
copyright owners are analogous to the rights of ordinary property
owners. After all, copyright is intellectual property—but property,
nonetheless.4
At the same time, copyright regulates speech.5 Most of the
works that receive copyright protection also constitute speech
within the meaning of the Constitution. The First Amendment
defines speech as any activity that conveys a particular and
identifiable meaning and encompasses everything from political
speeches to commercial slogans to burning the American flag as a

1

The Copyright Act provides that the author (or authors, in the case of joint
ownership) is the initial owner of copyright in the work. The author may transfer
copyright ownership or any of his exclusive rights to another person or entity. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(a), (d) (2006). In this Article, “author” refers to the initial owner of copyright,
while “copyright owner” refers to the person or entity who owns the copyright, whether
by transfer or initial authorship.
2
17 U.S.C § 106 (2007). In addition, authors of visual works have rights to attribution
and integrity. See id. § 106A.
3
The exclusivity of the copyright owner’s rights are subject to a number of
exceptions, including fair use, reproduction by libraries and archives and certain kinds of
secondary transmissions. See id. §§ 107–112, 117, 119, 121–22. As well, § 115 provides
a scheme for the compulsory licensing of non-dramatic musical works.
4
ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 13
(7th ed. 2006) (“Copyright is generally regarded as a form of property, but it is property
of a unique kind.”).
5
The U.S. Constitution recognizes the right to free “speech,” while the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes the right to the freedom of “expression.” See
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Constitution Act, 1982, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 1982, ch. 11,
s. 2(b) (U.K.). Putting aside the doctrinal differences between these two rights, this
Article uses the terms “speech” and “expression” interchangeably.
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sign of protest.6 Whether in the form of books, music, art, dance,
or even computer programs, most if not all copyrightable subject
matter falls under the constitutional definition of speech.7
Moreover, the scope of protected speech and the scope of
copyrightable subject matter have expanded considerably. Courts
tend to take a liberal approach in defining what activities constitute
speech and frequently invalidate laws that restrict speech.8 At the
same time, a wide range of works can obtain copyright. Under the
current statute, any work that is original and fixed in a tangible
medium automatically receives copyright protection.9 With both
doctrines’ expansive definitions of subject matter, the class of

6

For constitutional purposes, speech exists where “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.” See Texas. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)
(quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)). The First Amendment
protects commercial speech. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is not wholly
outside of the protection of the First Amendment and statutory bans on advertising
prescription drug prices violated the First Amendment). The First Amendment also
protects flag-burning. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (holding that the act of burning an
American flag is expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment).
7
Examples of copyrightable works that are not speech might include functional forms
or charts. See Cont’l Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 263 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1958)
(granting copyright protection to an insurance form). But see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 104 (1879) (holding that a bookkeeping form was too intertwined with the underlying
idea to receive copyright). Architecture is given copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(8) but does not constitute speech. Computer programs are both copyrighted
works and speech under the First Amendment. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding a computer program is a
literary work and therefore protected by the First Amendment, making it an appropriate
subject of copyright); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
327 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also McGowan, infra note 42, at 292 (arguing that not all
copyrighted works are speech).
8
See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2488 (2006) (striking down a Vermont
statute limiting campaign expenditures); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S.
234, 256 (2002) (striking down a federal statute regulating visual depictions of child
pornography).
9
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2007) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”). Originality refers to a work
that is not copied from other works, and possesses a minimal amount of creativity. See
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The Copyright Act has
also greatly reduced the formalities of obtaining copyright. See GORMAN & GINSBURG,
supra note 4, at 41.
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copyrighted works that is also First Amendment protected speech
is very broad indeed.
Not surprisingly, the fact that copyright simultaneously deals
with both property and speech creates significant legal problems.
There is an inherent conflict between copyright, which gives
exclusive rights over expressive works, and the First Amendment,
which guarantees that the freedom of speech will not be
abridged.10 Simply put, copyright law has the potential to violate
the First Amendment. Since copyright gives exclusive rights to
authors to reproduce and disseminate their works, and these works
are also speech, copyright effectively limits the ways in which
others can exercise their right to free speech. The most typical
example of this conflict is found in the case of copyright
infringement.
While the copyright owner alleges that the
defendant copied a substantial part of his work without permission,
the defendant counters that his actions were an act of free speech.
The argument is that by penalizing such actions, copyright unduly
infringes the defendant’s First Amendment rights and should be
modified to meet constitutional standards.11 In another context,
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of legislation that gave
copyright owners a right to control access to their works.12 It was
argued that this law substantially restricted the ability of others to
access works for their own speech purposes. In all these cases, the
basic claim is that copyright restricts speech in a way that runs
afoul of the First Amendment.13
10

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
11
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1985)
(holding that a magazine’s unauthorized publication of verbatim quotes from the “heart”
of unpublished presidential memoirs was not a fair use within the meaning of the
Copyright Revision Act).
12
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (challenging the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) (112 Stat. 2860 § 1201(a)(1), (2) (1998)), that amended title
17 of the U.S. Code to prohibit the circumvention of technological measures that control
access to copyrighted works and the trafficking of devices that do the same). It was
argued that the DMCA is unconstitutional because it prevents individuals from accessing
protected works in order to make fair use of them. Id.
13
This Article focuses on the conflict between copyright and the First Amendment as it
arises in cases of copyright infringement. However, copyright law is also susceptible to
challenges under the Copyright Clause in the Constitution. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the
plaintiffs argued that Congress’ extension of the copyright term was inconsistent with the
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Over the past thirty years, scholars and courts have grappled
with the conflict between copyright and free speech. For the most
part, the courts have concluded that copyright is compatible with
the First Amendment. Copyright’s speech-limiting effects are
justified by the broader and ultimately speech-enhancing purpose
of encouraging the creation of copyrighted works.14 In addition,
the courts assert that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use
doctrine keep copyright in line with the First Amendment.15
However, most commentators disagree with the courts’
presumptive validity of copyright and argue that the existing law
does not adequately respect speech interests.
Due to the
elusiveness of the fair use defense, the ever-increasing duration of
the copyright term, and the expanding breadth of authors’ rights,
the majority of commentators argue that copyright unduly infringes
the speech rights of others.16 As such, they suggest that copyright
law is unconstitutional.
The major flaw in this debate is that it ignores the fact that
copyright deals with both property and speech. On one hand,
Constitution’s grant of rights to authors for “limited times.” 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003);
see also Kahle v. Ashcroft, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1888 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004) (where
plaintiff argued that the elimination of the notice and renewal formalities in the copyright
statute fundamentally altered the traditional contours of copyright and thereby infringed
the First Amendment).
14
The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
15
See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20 (stating copyright law inherently contains First
Amendment accommodations because it only allows expressions, not ideas, to be subject
to copyright protection).
16
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12–26, 69–74 (2001) (criticizing the idea/expression dichotomy and
fair use as inadequate accommodations of free speech, and describing the constitutional
challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act that was the subject of
litigation in Eldred); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 541–45 (2004) (arguing that
copyright law’s continual expansion means that it threatens more speech than ever
before); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 11 (2002) (describing the speech-restricting effects of copyright’s ongoing
enlargement); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 414–29 (1999)
(discussing how anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA endanger the freedom of
speech).
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commentators have attempted to portray copyright as a form of
speech regulation.17 They emphasize the ways in which copyright
substantially limits the speech abilities of others. Accordingly,
they argue that copyright ought to be evaluated in the same way
that other speech laws are evaluated, such as campaign finance or
obscenity laws.18 Others argue that the copyright jurisprudence
devalues the speech interests of subsequent speakers and that
copyright ought to serve the interests of a broader range of
speakers.19 The common thread amongst these scholars is that
they all conceive of copyright as something that restricts speech.
On the other hand, the courts have rejected this characterization
of copyright. In most First Amendment cases, judges have
summarily dismissed free speech arguments. Courts either insist
that copyright has already incorporated free speech concerns—
hence the famous, yet conclusory, remark that copyright is “the
engine of free expression”20—or they downplay the defendant’s
speech interests, claiming that his conduct simply does not engage
the First Amendment.21 These cases demonstrate the courts’
unwillingness to equate copyright with other speech-regulating
laws. They seem to treat copyright as a different kind of regime—
a regime that creates entitlements that properly belong to the
copyright owner and do not necessarily affect the speech interests
of others.22
17
See, e.g., McGowan, infra note 42, at 291 (“Most free speech critiques of copyright
take it for granted that copyright is a governmental restriction on speech.”).
18
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding that provisions limiting
campaign contributions violated candidates’ rights to free speech); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (holding that the FCC could disallow certain language
from being used in public broadcasts without infringing on the broadcaster’s First
Amendment rights).
19
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 16, at 565–67 (arguing that pure copyright can serve
free speech values); Carys J. Craig, Putting the Community in Communication:
Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright, 56 U. TORONTO
L.J. 75, 76 (2006) (arguing that copyright should serve the speech interests of the broader
community).
20
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
21
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003) (“Protection of [copyright]
does not raise the free speech concerns present when the government compels or burdens
the communication of particular facts and ideas. The First Amendment . . . bears less
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”).
22
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557.
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This Article argues that the conflict between copyright and free
speech should be re-examined by treating copyright as a form of
property. What the academics fail to consider, and what the courts
naturally gravitate to, is the fact that copyright is primarily a
property regime that deals with an owner’s rights in his intellectual
property. The reason why courts do not apply First Amendment
analysis to copyright is not because of a desire to immunize
copyright from the Constitution or an inability to grasp the
defendants’ speech interests. Rather, the courts regard copyright
as a form of property that does not necessarily affect speech rights
at all. Indeed, the defendant’s conduct often seems more like a
violation of the copyright owner’s property rights than a
conflicting exercise of free speech. If copyright is property, the
defendant who copies another person’s work looks more like a
thief than a speaker.
Of course, this is not to say that copyright does not affect
speech. Since so many copyrighted works are also constitutionally
recognized speech, the rules and restrictions imposed by copyright
law inevitably impact the right to free speech. However, treating
copyright as property does not mean it is exempt from speech
concerns. In fact, a property-based analysis can shed more light on
how copyright conflicts with the First Amendment and how this
conflict can be resolved. The main problem with the courts’
approach is that it has failed to acknowledge that property can
infringe upon speech interests in its own right. Through the wellestablished public forum doctrine, the courts have scrutinized
property rights and whether they unjustifiably encroach upon
individuals’ speech rights. The fact that copyright is property,
then, does not immunize it from the First Amendment. Instead, it
establishes a clear basis upon which copyright can be
constitutionally analyzed. Since copyright creates a quasi-public
forum, it ought to accommodate the speech interests of the public
to the satisfaction of the Constitution.
This Article begins with an overview of the existing cases and
commentary that deal with the conflict between copyright law and
the First Amendment. While academics portray copyright as
regulation that significantly restricts speech, the courts view
copyright as a form of property that does not necessarily affect
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speech at all. In this regard, a comparison with Canadian
jurisprudence is useful because Canadian courts have expressly
treated copyright as property. In Part III, it is argued that copyright
is a property regime that only incidentally affects speech. In light
of its public purposes, however, copyright should be understood as
a form of quasi-public property that is meant to facilitate the
speech of others. Finally, Part IV of this Article explains that
copyright’s property status does not exempt it from the First
Amendment. Specifically, copyright can be compared to a public
forum which ought to be made available for speech purposes that
are compatible with the property, and which do not unduly infringe
the private interests of the owner. In this way, viewing copyright
as property does not foreclose free speech concerns, but instead
provides a clear and novel framework with which to understand the
conflict between copyright and free speech.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: THE
EXISTING FRAMEWORK
A. The Commentators Treat Copyright as Speech Regulation
There is extensive literature examining the conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment. For the most part, this
literature focuses on the way that copyright inherently burdens free
speech. In 1970, Melville Nimmer wrote a seminal article
describing the way in which copyright and speech potentially
contradict each other.23 Since copyright prohibits the unauthorized
use of copyrighted expression, it necessarily abridges the freedom
of expression.24 However, Nimmer concluded that existing
copyright law adequately accommodated speech interests.
Through the idea/expression dichotomy, which reserves expression
but leaves ideas free for the taking, and the fair use defense, which
justifies copyright infringement for certain public policy reasons,
copyright has already determined the appropriate balance between

23

Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1180 (1970).
24
Id. at 1181.
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copyright and speech.25 Although Nimmer identified specific
instances in which copyright law may need to be modified to
accommodate the First Amendment, he argued that copyright law
itself supplied sufficient safeguards for speech interests.26 As
such, he implicitly accepted that copyright is a form of speech
regulation, though he believed it already contained its own ways to
deal with these problems.27
Subsequent scholarship has reached less optimistic
conclusions. Some scholars argue that copyright should be
analyzed under the First Amendment like other kinds of speech
regulation. For example, Lemley and Volokh argue that copyright
is a form of content-based speech regulation because its restriction
depends on the content of the defendant’s speech.28 Since
infringement depends on how substantially similar the defendant’s
work is to the copyrighted work, copyright’s prohibitive effects are
based on the content of the defendant’s work.29 Although other
scholars have criticized this analysis, it represents an effort to
25
Id. at 1189–91, 1200 (arguing that copyright was the product of “definitional
balancing” between the freedom of speech and the need to encourage authors to create
works). Other scholars have argued that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use are
too vague or uncertain to adequately protect speech interests. See Netanel, supra note 16,
at 12–26; Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 13–16, 18–21. In doing so, they implicitly accept
Nimmer’s basic proposition that copyright can accommodate free speech, only they
believe that these doctrines need to be modified to meet constitutional standards. The
defense of fair use provides that copyright infringement is not a violation if the purpose
of the use was for criticism, comment, news reporting, and other similar purposes. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
26
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1197–99. For example, Nimmer argues that home movie
films of the John F. Kennedy assassination and photographs of the My Lai massacre are
works where the ideas and expression are so “wedded together” that one cannot conjure
up the idea without also using the expression. Id. In this case, Nimmer suggests that the
substantial speech values at stake would be served by having compulsory licenses. Id.
27
See id. at 1192 (acknowledging that prohibiting the reproduction of copyrighted
works infringes the freedom of speech, but “this is justified by the greater public good in
the copyright encouragement of creative works”).
28
See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 186 (1998). A similar argument is
advanced by Jed Rubenfeld. See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 5.
29
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 28, at 186; see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,
472–73 (2d Cir. 1946) (infringement is determined by looking at the substantial similarity
of the allegedly infringing work to the original); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (where Justice Learned Hand conducted a detailed, substantive
evaluation of the allegedly infringing work to determine whether there was infringement).
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portray copyright as regulation that significantly intrudes on
speech interests and should be analyzed as such.30
Others contend that copyright is content-neutral speech
regulation that ought to be evaluated according to the First
Amendment jurisprudence. Netanel argues that copyright law is
content-neutral because although infringement is based on the
content of the defendant’s speech, it is neutral in regards to
viewpoint.31 Just as copyright protection can apply to a wide range
of works, irrespective of their content or artistic merit,32
copyright’s corresponding limitation on subsequent speakers
applies irrespective of their message or viewpoint.33 Netanel
argues that copyright is better viewed as content-neutral speech
regulation that should be subject to more “rigorous” scrutiny.34
Relying on the example of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC,35 Netanal compares copyright to a governmental system that

30
See Netanel, supra note 16, at 48–49 (arguing that, with respect to copyright law,
“content sensitive” does not mean “content-based” within the meaning of the First
Amendment); McGowan, infra note 42, at 294–96 (arguing that courts make distinctions
based on content to identify situations where First Amendment values trump competing
values). If copyright is content-based speech regulation, it is subject to higher levels of
scrutiny than content-neutral regulation. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
31
Netanel, supra note 16, at 49. The Supreme Court distinguishes between laws that
are content-based and those that discriminate on viewpoint, but it has stated that contentbased laws are “presumptively invalid.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. However, viewpoint
discrimination is also seen as being particularly objectionable. See id. at 391. For present
purposes, this article assumes that Netanel considers copyright as content-neutral
regulation that deserves less scrutiny than content-based regulation; which may or may
not discriminate according to one’s viewpoint. Although Rubenfeld argues that copyright
is content-based, he notes that where a finding of infringement does not require an
understanding of the words used, the prohibition is content-neutral. See Rubenfeld, supra
note 16, at 48–49.
32
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (holding that
since “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,” the artistic merit
of a work did not determine whether it obtained copyright protection).
33
Netanel, supra note 16, at 49; see also Lillian R. BeVier, Copyright, Trespass, and
the First Amendment: An Institutional Perspective, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 104, 130
(2004) (arguing that enforcing copyright does not involve governmental discrimination
based on viewpoint).
34
Netanel, supra note 16, at 55.
35
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).

LIU_121307_FINAL

2008]

12/13/2007 10:08:55 PM

COPYRIGHT AS QUASI-PUBLIC PROPERTY

393

allocates speech entitlements amongst various speakers.36 Courts
determine the constitutionality of these systems by examining the
nature of the government’s purpose, whether there is satisfactory
factual support for the purpose, and the propriety of the
government’s means.37 Netanel argues that copyright should be
subject to the same kind of rigorous scrutiny that was applied in
Turner.38 His argument explicitly treats copyright as speech
regulation that should be analyzed using the same First
Amendment standards that apply to similar forms of regulation.
Still others argue that the speech interests of those who borrow
from copyrighted works should be taken more seriously. While
transformative borrowing ought to receive fair use protection, nontransformative or even verbatim copying can serve valid speech
interests. For instance, Tushnet argues that given the nature of
what is copied, the speaker’s intent, and the surrounding context,
even wholesale copying of a copyrighted work can engage First
Amendment values.39 Tushnet uses the example of a speaker
repeating Dr. Martin Luther King’s iconic “I Have a Dream”
36

Netanel, supra note 16 at 55–56; Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 662 (holding that
provisions requiring cable television system operators to broadcast local stations is
subject to intermediate scrutiny, which is applicable to content-neutral restrictions on
speech). Moreover, Netanel argues that copyright “brazenly and consistently” allocates
speech entitlements to benefit copyright owners while burdening the public at large.
Netanel, supra note 16, at 69.
37
Netanel, supra note 16, at 58 (discussing that in determining the constitutionality of
these systems, courts consider whether there are less speech-restrictive means of
furthering the governmental interest).
38
Id. at 58–59 (describing the court’s approach in Turner as an application of the
intermediate scrutiny standard with “unaccustomed vigor”). Intermediate scrutiny is
usually applied to “time, place or manner” regulations, which are justified if they meet an
important state interest and are narrowly tailored so as to not burden more speech than is
necessary. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (finding that a
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it furthers an important government
interest and is tailored so it restricts First Amendment freedoms no more than necessary);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (reaffirming that a “time, place,
or manner” regulation must be narrowly tailored to a legitimate, content-neutral,
government interest). On the other hand, rigorous scrutiny involves more searching
inquiry about the government’s interest, the factual support for that interest, and whether
there is a precise “fit” between the means and ends. Netanel, supra note 16, at 58.
Although Netanel’s article is somewhat unclear about whether the standard of review he
argues for is “rigorous scrutiny,” “heightened scrutiny,” or “intermediate scrutiny,” this
Article assumes he uses these terms interchangeably.
39
Tushnet, supra note 16, at 546.
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speech at a civil rights rally to point out that verbatim copying can
serve important political and democratic values and further the
speaker’s self-fulfillment and autonomy.40 The speaker has good
reasons for copying King—it references the significance of King’s
original speech, it lends authenticity to the speaker’s current
speech, and it evokes the historical and political significance that
the speech has in the public psyche.41 In this way, copying
copyrighted works can serve interests that are traditionally valued
under the First Amendment. To the extent that copyright prohibits
such speech, it is a form of speech regulation that unduly
diminishes the scope of free speech.
Even scholars who disagree about the First Amendment’s
application to copyright accept the basic premise that copyright
regulates speech. Specifically, David McGowan describes the
tension between copyright and free speech as involving the
conflicting speech interests of two speakers.42
Copyright
infringement is the clash between the speech interests of the
plaintiff-copyright owner and the defendant.43
However,
McGowan argues that the First Amendment is not equipped to
resolve such speaker-speaker disputes. He asserts that the First
Amendment usually deals with the conflict between an individual’s
speech and a non-speech-related governmental interest, such as
national security or public order.44 In these cases, the courts
40
Id. at 574–78. Tushnet notes that King’s “original speech” delivered in front of the
Lincoln Memorial was not in fact original, since he had delivered similar speeches on
many prior occasions. Id. at 575. Tushnet points out that given the context of the 250,000
marchers gathered in Washington, D.C., the speech took on new significance. Id. at 575–
76. With regard to the speech values at stake, there are three oft-cited rationales for free
speech: the discovery of truth, political participation, and self-fulfillment. See Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878–79
(1963).
41
See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 568–81 (describing copying as a means of selfexpression, persuasion, and affirmation).
42
David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 281, 285, 301 (2004).
43
See id. at 285 (describing how copyright pits the interests of an “upstream” author
against a “downstream” author, thereby implying that both parties have the same speech
rights at stake).
44
Id. at 296. For example, speech regulations created for the purpose of national
security or public order include the laws at issue in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969) (holding that states may proscribe First Amendment rights only when free
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determine whether the law’s restrictions on speech are justified by
the proffered governmental purpose. However, since copyright
pits one person’s speech interest against another’s, and both people
have presumptively equal claims to free speech, the First
Amendment does not have the tools to adjudicate the dispute.45
McGowan’s argument is problematic in many ways. It can be
argued, for instance, that there are First Amendment cases dealing
with speaker-speaker conflict,46 or that existing First Amendment
doctrine should apply despite the lack of precedent. Nonetheless,
he concedes that copyright regulates speech. Thus, while
McGowan acknowledges that copyright affects the speech interests
of copyright owners and subsequent speakers, he does not think the
First Amendment can resolve this problem.47
There are good reasons why scholars tend to characterize
copyright as a form of speech regulation. Over the past several
decades, the courts have continually expanded the scope and
meaning of the right to free speech. A wide array of activities,
such as commercial speech, campaign spending, nonverbal
conduct and silence all constitute protected speech.48 The courts
have also narrowed the categories of speech that fall outside the

speech or free press is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action and is likely
to produce such action, thereby endangering the public security). See also N.Y. Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that any restraints on expression carry a
presumption of unconstitutionality).
45
McGowan, supra note 42, at 284–85, 300–01 (arguing that the First Amendment
does not provide a basis with which to distinguish between the rights of “upstream”
versus “downstream” users).
46
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 572–73 (1995) (holding that a state could not require individuals to alter the content
of their First Amendment expressions, even though the expressions, as they were,
violated a state public accommodation law); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
659 (2000) (holding that requiring the Boy Scouts to allow a homosexual to be a
scoutmaster violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association).
47
McGowan, supra note 42, at 299 (acknowledging that there are problems with
treating copyright as speech restriction, and conceding that it affects “significant amounts
of expression”).
48
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding
that local authorities cannot compel salutation of the United States flag); see also Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding the right to speak and the right to refrain
from speaking are protected by the First Amendment).
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First Amendment.49 At the same time, courts often strike down
laws that restrict speech in many different contexts.50 Given the
liberal definition of free speech in American law, it is not
surprising that scholars tend to emphasize the speech interests at
stake in order to criticize copyright law. The more that copyright
looks like intrusive speech regulation, the more likely it is that
courts will favour defendants and re-shape copyright law to
accommodate their speech interests.

B. The Courts Treat Copyright as Property
The argument that copyright is a form of speech regulation has
been largely unsuccessful in the courts. Although the courts
concede that copyright is not “categorically immune” from
constitutional scrutiny, they have concluded that existing copyright
law meets First Amendment standards.51 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the
Supreme Court dealt summarily with the constitutional challenge
by declaring that “copyright contains built-in First Amendment
accommodations.”52 Borrowing directly from Nimmer, the Court
identified the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use as the
accommodations that kept copyright compatible with free speech.53
Without analyzing the specific ways in which copyright burdens
speech and how it mitigates those burdens, the Court assumed that
copyright is consistent with the First Amendment. This cursory
49

For example, the unprotected class of “fighting words” is limited to speech that
directly incites anger in others, and not generalized epithets or insults. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that Cohen’s jacket, which displayed an
offensive slogan, did not constitute fighting words because “[n]o individual . . . could
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult”).
50
See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997) (finding
that where a statute is plagued by vagueness, and promulgated to regulate content-based
speech, significant First Amendment concerns arise).
51
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Eldred v. Reno that copyright was “categorically immune from challenges
under the First Amendment” (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
52
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. The petitioners argued that the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act was a content-neutral regulation that failed heightened judicial
review under the First Amendment, but the Court rejected this as “uncommonly strict
scrutiny” for copyright. Id. at 218–19.
53
Id. at 219–20.
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treatment of copyright is striking in light of the substantial
attention that courts usually give to other speech regulations.54 At
a minimum, these laws are scrutinized in terms of whether there is
a compelling state interest and whether the means chosen is
tailored to suit the ends.55 It may be that the Court simply believes
that copyright satisfies this test, as is suggested by the statement
that as long as copyright stays within its “traditional contours,”
First Amendment scrutiny is not necessary.56 But the complete
lack of analysis suggests that the court treats copyright as a
different kind of regime that does not need to be subjected to
normal First Amendment analysis.
Moreover, the Eldred Court questioned whether there is a
conflict between copyright and free speech in the first place.57
Justice Ginsburg opined that since the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment were adopted at around the same time, the
Framers intended for copyright to be compatible with free
speech.58 The Court argued that copyright does not conflict with
the First Amendment since it gives authors an economic incentive
to create and distribute their works.59 Thus, copyright actually
enhances individuals’ speech abilities. Given that copyright’s
purpose is to facilitate the creation and dissemination of
expression, it cannot properly be conceived of as a speechrestricting regulation. Although copyright may affect some
speech, its overall effect is to further the goals of free speech and,
therefore, it does not merit First Amendment scrutiny.
Yet there is another important reason why the courts are so
resistant to applying First Amendment analysis to copyright. In
54

For example, even relatively mundane regulations have been scrutinized under the
First Amendment. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559–60 (1948) (invalidating a
city ordinance prohibiting trucks with sound amplification devices).
55
This refers to the intermediate scrutiny standard, which applies to a wide variety of
speech regulations. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
56
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
57
Id. at 194.
58
Id. at 219. However, it can be argued that the co-existence of the Copyright Clause
and the First Amendment does not immunize the former from the latter. Congress’
powers are limited by the Bill of Rights, which includes the First Amendment. See
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1181–82; Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 12–13.
59
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985)).
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Eldred, Justice Ginsburg explained that the First Amendment
“protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own
speech.”60 However, Ginsburg further stated that the First
Amendment “bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to
make other people’s speeches.”61 The choice of words is
revealing: the First Amendment applies with less force when a
person makes someone else’s speech. The suggestion is that the
First Amendment does not grant a person the right to use another
person’s speech as his own. By emphasizing the fact that the
speech belongs to someone else, the Eldred Court seems to view
copyright not as a form of speech regulation, but as a form of
property.62 The reason the First Amendment does not apply to
copyright is because there is a property interest in play instead of a
speech interest. In the Court’s view, the speaker who uses the
copyrighted work is not so much borrowing the work as he is
stealing it—stealing the creative expression of the original work in
which the owner has a proprietary interest. For this reason, the
Court drew a distinction between a speaker who makes his “own”
speech and a speaker who makes “other people’s speeches.”63 The
person who makes other people’s speeches is not exercising his
right to speech, but is simply misappropriating property that
belongs to another.
The Eldred Court’s reference to making one’s own speeches
does not mean that a speaker must say something novel or original
to merit First Amendment protection.64 A requirement of novelty
or originality would be wholly foreign to the First Amendment.65
The right to free speech does not depend on whether the speaker
says something new or creative.66 A person who waves a placard
60

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
Id.
62
See id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1181 (noting that the First Amendment does not only
protect speech that is original to the speaker); see also Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 391 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding that reproductions are
entitled to First Amendment protection).
66
See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1181 (noting the basic principle that underlies
opposition to governmental censorship: the First Amendment does not only protect
speech that is original to the speaker but protects speech for all men whether or not they
61
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is exercising his right to free speech notwithstanding the fact that
someone else wrote the slogan, or the slogan was an unoriginal,
generic phrase like “War is Terrorism.” It would be inimical to the
values of free speech to require speakers to say something unique
in order to gain the protection of the First Amendment.67
Evidently, the notion of originality is derived from copyright.
Copyright only applies to original works—works that are not
copied from another source and that possess a minimal amount of
creativity.68 This threshold is low, but it nevertheless bars works
which are almost identical to existing works.69 When Eldred and
other cases suggest that free speech does not encompass the right
to make other people’s speeches,70 this cannot be understood to
introduce an originality requirement into the First Amendment.71
The problem with an individual taking another person’s speech is
not that speech must be original to that individual, but that the
speech actually belongs to someone else. In other words, the
court’s language of “other people’s speeches” must refer to the

qualify as artistic creators); see also Comedy III Prods., 25 Cal. 4th 387 at 391 (holding
that reproductions are entitled to First Amendment protection).
67
Given the values of autonomy, self-fulfillment, and truth-seeking that underlie the
right to free speech, it would seem that a person’s intention to engage in expressive
conduct suffices for First Amendment protection. See Emerson, supra note 40, at 878–79.
68
Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citations
omitted).
69
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884) (holding that
the photographer’s role in posing the subject, and selecting and arranging the costume
and draperies constituted sufficient originality for copyright purposes); Alfred Bell & Co.
v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that mezzo-tint
reproductions of existing works could obtain copyright).
70
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
71
The Canadian jurisprudence has also referred to the need for originality. In Michelin,
the court reviewed the cases of Canadian Tire Corp. v. Retail Clerks Union, [1985] 7
C.P.R. (3d) 415 (F.C.T.D.) (Can.) and R. v. Lorimer [1984], 77 C.P.R. (2d) 262 (F.C.A.).
Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, (F.C.T.D.)
(Can.). These cases considered the relationship between the Charter and copyright. The
Michelin court concluded, “it appears that [these cases] found that the infringers’ use of
the copyrighted material demonstrated insufficient original thought to be labeled
protected expression under Section 2(b).” Id. ¶ 84. The court went on to reject the need
for originality and held that because the definition for expression under § 2(b) was not
equivalent to the definition of “original works” under the Copyright Act, the defendant’s
works were examples of expression, even though they were not original works for the
purposes of the Copyright Act. Id. ¶ 91.
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proprietary aspect of speech in order to be consistent with the First
Amendment.72
The notion that copyright is property regulation instead of
speech regulation animates other cases as well.73 For example, in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the
defendants argued that their copying of a Gerald Ford memoir was
justified because of the public’s First Amendment interests in the
work’s contents.74 The Court rejected this argument because,
although the work was one of high public interest, the copyright
owner possessed the exclusive right of first publication.75 The
Court stated that “[t]he author’s control of first public distribution
implicates not only his personal interest in creative control but his
property interest in exploitation of prepublication rights . . . .”76
The Court indicated that copyright gives authors a property right in
the form of a right to benefit from the initial publication of the
work.77 The court went on to say that as a property right, the right
to first publication is likely to outweigh any claim of fair use.78 In
this way, the court treated the copyright owner’s interest as a
property right that would not be easily displaced by speech
interests. Indeed, Harper & Row featured both the intangible and
tangible appropriation of property. The fact that the defendants
had actually obtained a stolen copy of the manuscript lent further
support to the notion that the issue was about property, not
speech.79 As in Eldred, the court rejected the First Amendment
72

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 24 (describing earlier cases in which the courts have
suggested that copyright is a property right).
74
471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
75
See id. at 553, 555–56.
76
Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
77
Id.
78
Id. (“Under ordinary circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use”). The
Harper & Row Court’s emphasis on the right to first publication was so substantial that
Congress subsequently amended the Copyright Act to make it clear that unpublished
works did not necessarily rule against a finding of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)
(“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”).
79
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985)
(describing the clandestine circumstances under which the defendants obtained a copy of
the manuscript).
73
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challenge because it viewed copyright as a property right, so that
the defendant’s conduct was more like a misappropriation of the
copyright owner’s property than an exercise of free speech.
Interpreting the court’s approach to copyright and free speech
through the lens of property gives a better explanation of their
jurisprudence to date. The courts have declined to apply normal
First Amendment doctrine in copyright cases.80 This is not
because they fail to appreciate the conflict between copyright and
speech or the significance of the defendant’s speech interests. Nor
are they trying to exempt copyright from the requirements of the
First Amendment.81 Neither of these explanations is compelling
given the court’s able application of First Amendment doctrine in
other contexts. Instead, courts see copyright as a set of property
rights that belong to authors and copyright owners. As such,
speech interests are not necessarily implicated in every case where
another person makes speech using copyrighted material. Instead,
many of these cases are better understood as situations where the
subsequent speaker misappropriated property that belongs to
another person.
C. Copyright as Property: The Canadian Example
A comparison with the Canadian copyright jurisprudence is
instructive. Although Canadian case law regarding copyright and
free speech is relatively under-developed, there are cases that have
directly acknowledged the link between copyright and property.
By way of background, subsection 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) guarantees the freedom of
expression.82
Although Canadian courts have adopted a
comparably broad definition of expression, the freedom of
expression under the Charter is arguably more limited than the

80

See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 7 (describing copyright’s magical immunity from
First Amendment scrutiny).
82
Subsection 2(b) provides, “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: . . .
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
81
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freedom of speech under the First Amendment.83 This may be due
to the fact that the Charter contains a limitations clause in § 1,
which provides that constitutional rights are subject to the
reasonable limits that are found in a free and democratic society.84
Together with a different social and political climate, the right to
free expression has received less liberal interpretations than free
speech in the U.S.85 In terms of copyright, the U.S. and Canada
have similar copyright statutes, granting a similar set of exclusive
rights and protecting a comparable breadth of works.86 One
notable difference is that fair use is called “fair dealing” under the
Canadian statute and is limited to the enumerated purposes of
research, criticism, commentary, review, and news reporting.87
83

See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Que., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, ¶ 56 (Can.) (defining expression as
including activity which conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, but excluding
violence); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (upholding a law which
criminalized hate speech under the Charter). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., 505 U.S.
377 (1992) (striking down a statute prohibiting the placement of symbols known to
arouse anger or alarm based on race, creed or gender).
84
Section 1 provides, “[the Charter] guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). The
limitations clause may restrain the interpretation of the freedom of expression because it
explicitly recognizes that Charter rights are not absolute, and provides guidelines for the
court to determine the limits of such rights. See Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can.,
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, ¶ 7 (Can.) (describing section 1 of the Charter as one of the
“fundamental differences between the American Constitution and the Charter”) (per
Lamer J.).
85
See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 7. In general, the Canadian courts have expressed
caution about applying American constitutional law to the Charter. See Keegstra, 3
S.C.R., ¶¶ 52–61.
86
Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 3(1) (1985) (listing the exclusive rights to
produce, reproduce, perform, publish, and broadcast the work). Although the Canadian
statute does not explicitly grant a right to create derivative works, it grants the rights to
translate and adapt the work, as well as the right to convert a dramatic work into a nondramatic work, or vice versa. In addition, the Canadian statute grants moral rights to all
copyrighted works. Id. § 14.
87
For the purposes of criticism, review, or news reporting, the original work and its
author(s) must be identified. There is no need for identification if the work is used for
research or private study. Id. § 29–29.2. The term “fair dealing” is derived from English
copyright law. See The UK Copyright Service, UK Copyright Law Fact Sheet, Aug. 11,
2004, http://www.copyrightservice.co.uk/copyright/p01_uk_copyright_law.
The
Canadian courts have distinguished fair dealing from fair use. Cie Générale des
Établissements Michelin v. C.A.W., [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶ 71 (F.C.T.D.) (Can.).
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Unlike U.S. courts, Canadian courts have held that fair dealing
does not include additional kinds of purposes and that parody is
not a form of criticism that can be shielded by fair dealing.88
The key Canadian case dealing with the conflict between
copyright and the freedom of expression is Cie Générale des
Établissements Michelin v. C.A.W.89 CGEM Michelin, the
international tire-making company, brought a claim of copyright
infringement against a labor union.90 In order to unionize
employees at Michelin factories in Nova Scotia, the union
distributed leaflets and posters depicting the well-known Michelin
corporate logo, the Michelin Tire Man or “Bibendum.”91 In the
leaflets, the union portrayed the Michelin Tire Man not as the
smiling marshmallow figure he normally is, but as a menacing
giant about to crush tiny employees positioned under his foot.92
Not surprisingly, the union did not obtain Michelin’s permission to
reproduce the logo.93 The defendants argued that their use of the
Michelin Tire Man was a parody sheltered by fair dealing, or
alternatively, that their constitutional right to freedom of
expression protected their conduct.94
In Michelin, the Canadian court rejected the union’s
constitutional challenge and explicitly recognized copyright as a
property right.95 Despite the arguably important values served by
the union’s activity, the court found that its freedom of expression
had not been restricted.96 In the court’s words, “[t]he Charter does
88

See CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, ¶ 54 (Can.)
(holding that although the fair dealing purposes ought to be interpreted liberally, they
were limited to those enumerated in the statute); Michelin, 71 C.P.R. (3d), ¶ 71 (holding
that parody is not a form of criticism under the Canadian Copyright Act).
89
71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (holding that parody is not a form of criticism under the Canadian
Copyright Act).
90
Id. ¶ 3.
91
Id. ¶ 8.
92
Id.
93
Id. ¶ 3.
94
Id. ¶ 71 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that parody is a form of “criticism”
under fair dealing).
95
Id. ¶ 93.
96
It could be argued that the union’s purpose of recruiting employees to its
organization served an important political function. See James Pope, The Three-Systems
Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HAST. CONST. L.Q.
189 (1984).
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not confer the right to use private property—the Plaintiff’s
copyright—in the service of freedom of expression.”97 With this
statement, the court clearly circumscribes the freedom of
expression at the point where it conflicts with the copyright
owner’s property right. No matter what the definition of the
freedom of expression may be, it does not grant speakers the right
to use a copyrighted work to make speech.98 In the court’s view,
the union may have been expressing itself, but such expression was
not protected where it involved misappropriating someone else’s
property. As such, the union was not exercising its freedom of
expression but was akin to a trespasser who uses private property
to express himself or herself.99 This decision reflects the way in
which courts treat copyright as property, as well as their tendency
to elevate property rights over speech in copyright cases.100
In summary, both the U.S. and Canadian jurisprudence
demonstrate the courts’ unwillingness to treat copyright as a form
of speech regulation. The courts do not apply normal First
Amendment analysis to copyright because they view copyright as a
property right that does not necessarily affect the speech interests
of others. Although they do not say as much, the Eldred Court’s
opinion that free speech does not include the right to use another
person’s speech101 suggests that they understand copyright
infringement as an act of appropriation rather than expression.
However, the courts are mistaken to conclude that copyright’s
property status removes it from the scrutiny of the First
Amendment. It is as property that copyright must be analyzed for
whether it unjustifiably infringes on the free speech of others.

97

Michelin, 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶ 85.
Id. ¶ 93.
99
The court noted that the defendants were not claiming the right to distribute antiMichelin leaflets on the company’s premises, for that would clearly constitute an illegal
trespass. Rather, the defendants argued that they had a right to actually use the
company’s property to express themselves. In this way, the court suggests that the use of
copyrighted property is akin to, or perhaps even more invasive than, trespass. See id.¶ 96.
100
See Craig, supra note 19, at 85.
101
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
98
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II. COPYRIGHT IS QUASI-PUBLIC PROPERTY
Aside from the courts’ interpretations, is copyright better
characterized as property or speech regulation? Given the nature
of the copyright scheme, it is arguable that copyright gives
property rights to authors and owners to allow them to control and
exploit their works. The main purpose of copyright is not to
regulate speech, but to establish a set of property rights that give
authors the economic incentive to create works. In this way,
copyright is a form of property that only incidentally affects the
speech interests of others. However, characterizing copyright as
property does not mean it is immune from First Amendment
concerns. Since copyright has public dimensions, it is a form of
quasi-public property that must accommodate the speech interests
of others.
A. Copyright is a Property Right
From the perspective of authors and owners, copyright has
more to do with property rights than speech rights. The exclusive
rights enjoyed by the copyright owner form the crux of copyright
law.102 The statute provides that an owner can transfer these rights
to another person or entity, but only if the transfer is signed and in
writing.103 The fact that copyright entitlements must be transferred
in a voluntary transaction between the parties illustrates the
proprietary nature of copyright.104 Like other property rights, the
state decides whom the entitlement belongs to, but it does not
determine the value of the right nor compel the owner to

102

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2006). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act gives
additional rights to control access to and prevent the circumvention of technologically
protected works. Id. § 1201(a)–(b).
103
Id. § 204. Notably the statute specifically provides that where there is no voluntary
transfer, state action purporting to seize or expropriate the rights is invalid. See id. §
201(e); see also Effects Assoc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming
that a transfer of copyright must be in writing).
104
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972)
(describing a property rule as one where “someone who wishes to remove the entitlement
from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller”).
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participate in the transaction.105 Thus, copyright creates property
rights rather than liability rules, which govern both the assignment
of the entitlement and its value.106 In addition, the exclusivity of
copyright suggests that it is a form of property.107 The most
powerful aspect of copyright is not that owners can sell, reproduce
or perform their works, but that they possess an exclusive right to
do so. Certainly, owners are able to sell and disseminate their
works in the absence of copyright, and copyright does not directly
assist them in these activities. Copyright limits the number of
people who can carry out these activities and gives them the ability
to prevent others from doing the same. In this way, a copyright
owner is similar to an owner of tangible property—both possess an
exclusive entitlement to their property. As owners, they enjoy
exclusive possession of their property and have the right to exclude
others.108
Furthermore, the rights granted by copyright are the intellectual
property equivalents of the rights belonging to owners of real
property.109 Like landowners, copyright owners possess rights that
allow them to use and enjoy their property.110 For example, the
copyright owner’s rights to reproduce and distribute his work are
analogous to the real property owner’s rights to develop and sell
his land—both are ways in which the owners exploit and profit
from their property.111 Similarly, a property owner’s ability to
exclude trespassers is comparable to the copyright owner’s ability

105

Id.
Id. Liability rules are also ex post rules—that is, the value of the entitlement is
determined after the injury occurs. In contrast, the value of a property entitlement can be
determined before transfer or destruction.
107
BeVier, supra note 33, at 136 (“Since the very definition of a property right is that it
is an ‘exclusive right,’ the Copyright Clause explicitly contemplateS propertization.”).
108
JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 422–
24 (3d ed. 1989).
109
See BeVier, supra note 33, at 136 (noting that the Copyright Clause does explicitly
contemplate propertization).
110
See SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
74 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that a life tenant has a real property owner’s right to
undisturbed possession and of use and enjoyment of land).
111
See BeVier, supra note 33, at 108 (arguing that giving property rights to individuals
encourages them to use the property in ways that enhances its value).
106
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to refuse to license his work.112 Both actions involve retaining
exclusive control and a degree of privacy over one’s property.113
Likewise, bringing an action for copyright infringement is akin to
an action for trespass because they target unauthorized uses of
property. In this way, copyright is analogous to a property right
because it relates to how an owner can control, exploit and
dispense with the copyrighted work.
Of course, one important difference between copyright and
ordinary property is the incorporeal nature of intellectual property.
Unlike tangible property, the copyrighted property does not consist
of the physical copies of a work, but of the intangible expression
therein.114 This intangibility means that the boundaries of a
copyright owner’s property are not as clearly defined as the
boundaries of ordinary property, such as a piece of land.
Nevertheless, the owner’s rights are the same—the copyright
owner holds an exclusive entitlement to the copyrighted
expression.115 The incorporeal nature of the property does not
detract from the proprietary nature of the owner’s interest.
Furthermore, an individual can enjoy a copyrighted work in ways
that do not apply to ordinary property. For example, one can
highlight or annotate his copy of a copyrighted book without
infringing the copyright owner’s rights.116 In contrast, it is
112

Id. at 137–38 (“[T]here is a close analogy between what a court does in a copyright
case and what a judge does who enforces a trespass law . . .”); see CRIBBET & JOHNSON,
supra note 108, at 422 (describing a property owner’s right to exclude trespassers).
113
See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (enjoining
biographer from reprinting unpublished letters); see also NIMMER, supra note 23, at
1196–1203 (examining the privacy and copyright interests of persons such as
photographers and biography subjects).
114
See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 605 (1st Cir.
1993) (rejecting the argument that copyright ownership is based on physical possession
of the work).
115
BeVier defends the applicability of property rights to copyright by pointing out that
the property rights perform the same function as copyright. Whether applied to tangible
or intangible property, the rights are meant to encourage “optimal production and
investment.” BeVier, supra note 33, at 112.
116
The user’s annotations are not infringing provided that they do not amount to a
recasting or transformation of the underlying work—in which case, they may infringe the
owner’s derivative work right. Additionally, an owner of a copy of a work can sell or
transfer that copy without violating the copyright owner’s right to distribution or first
sale. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
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relatively difficult for someone to use another person’s property
without permission. Yet this difference only demonstrates the
public aspects of copyright. It does not demonstrate that
intellectual property is not property. Users’ ability to enjoy
copyrighted works is predicated on the owner’s decision to make
the work available to the public. Although copyright also protects
unknown, unpublished works, it is unlikely that others could make
use of these works.117 An important difference between copyright
law and the laws governing ordinary property is that copyright
actively encourages the public availability of a work, whereas
ordinary property rights provide no such incentive.118 Finally,
copyrighted property is non-rivalrous in nature.119 Books and
music are not scarce, limited resources in the same way that a tract
of land is. Although there are less physical constraints on the
existence of copyrighted property, the nature of the copyright
owner’s rights remain the same.120 Despite the intangibility of the
property, the owner enjoys exclusive ownership in the copyrighted
expression. In this way, while there are notable differences
between copyright and tangible property, they do not change the
fact that copyright owners possess a proprietary entitlement over
their works.
The remedies that are available to a copyright owner further
illustrate the proprietary nature of copyright. The Copyright Act
provides that if there is copyright infringement, the owner is
entitled to either a temporary or final injunction to prevent further

117

While it is possible for a person to reproduce an unpublished work without stealing
it, it is likely that this requires the actual theft of the work or a similar form of
appropriation. Like the defendants in Harper & Row, there would be an issue regarding
the physical appropriation of the author’s property, in addition to the issue of copyright
infringement. See infra notes 60–79 and accompanying text.
118
Property law may encourage an owner to put his land to useful purposes, but it does
not encourage him to make his land available to the public, for a fee or otherwise. See
BeVier, supra note 33, at 108 (arguing that property rights give owners an incentive to
make decisions that will enhance the property’s value).
119
Id. at 111.
120
BeVier makes a related argument by pointing out that the non-scarcity of
copyrighted property does not mean it should not be propertized. Id. at 111–14.
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infringement.121 Injunctive relief is also available to owners of
ordinary property, who can obtain injunctions to prevent trespass,
nuisance or other interferences with their property.122 Although
the courts and legal scholars have recognized that awarding
damages may be preferable to an injunction in some copyright
cases—for the reason that injunctions unduly prevent others from
exercising their right to free speech—the copyright statute makes
injunctive relief the primary mode of copyright enforcement.123
This reflects the notion that copyright infringement is not simply a
contractual or tortious claim for which monetary damages is
normally adequate compensation. Instead, copyright owners have
the right to directly enjoin the infringer’s activity, much like an
owner of real property.124 Nor is the availability of injunctive
relief, a consequence of the gravity of the offence. Copyright
infringement is not an inherently dangerous or irreversible offense
that requires an injunction in order to provide an effective remedy.
Rather, copyright’s remedies indicate a parallel to property rights.
Some have argued that copyright is not a property right
because the property that it deals with is also speech.126 While an
ordinary property owner can exclude trespassers for a variety of
reasons, a copyright owner excludes others because of their
expression. In other words, copyright is speech regulation because
121

The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2007). The statute also provides for
impounding orders, damages (including statutory damages), profits, attorney’s fees, and
criminal penalties. Id. §§ 503–06.
122
CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 397.
123
See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 6 (commenting that courts regularly issue
prepublication and preliminary injunctions in copyright cases); Lemley & Volokh, supra
note 28, at 158–59 (commenting that preliminary injunctions are the expected remedy
and plaintiffs are treated favorably); McGowan, supra note 42, at 328–31 (arguing
against replacing injunctions with damages). But see Pierre N. Leval, Commentary,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130–35 (1990) (arguing that
damages, rather than injunctions, should be the presumptive mode of remedy); Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (noting that “the goals of copyright
law . . . are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief” for
copyright infringement); Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (2001)
(holding that injunctive relief was improper given the lack of irreparable injury to
Suntrust and the First Amendment concerns at stake).
124
CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 108, at 397.
126
See e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 25; Netanel, supra note 16, at 39.
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it makes speech a part of the offense.127 In this way, copyright is
comparable to a trespass law that prohibits trespassers because
they want to hold a political protest.128 Such a law aims directly at
the speaker’s communicative conduct and, worse still, it targets the
content of his or her speech.129 However, it is inaccurate to say
that copyright law always penalizes others for their expressive
activity. The prototypical case of copyright infringement involves
the wholesale reproduction of a copyrighted work without the
owner’s consent.130 In these cases, it is likely that the defendant
used the copyrighted work for appropriative purposes rather than
speech purposes. Most verbatim copying is done for the purpose
of simply appropriating the existing work—indeed, that would be
one reason why the work was copied verbatim in the first place.
When copyright prohibits such copying, then, it is aimed at
conduct that does not necessarily implicate speech interests.131
Moreover, copyright does not penalize copying for the purpose of
restricting the freedom of expression.132 Copyright prohibits
copying in order to protect the rights of authors and owners and to
incentivize the creation of works. Since the purpose of the
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech, copyright does
not penalize others for their expression, but for their conduct that
harms the copyright owner’s property rights. Therefore, copyright
regulates conduct for its effects on property interests and not for
the fact that it is speech.133

127
See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 25–26 (“Copyright law, however, does render
people liable because they are speaking—and indeed, because of what they say”).
128
See id.
129
See id.
130
See McGowan, supra note 42, at 292 (pointing out that most “garden-variety
infringement suits” do not implicate the political suppression of speech); see also
Nimmer, supra note 23 at 1201–03 (arguing that there are cases where there is simply no
First Amendment justification for the copier’s actions).
131
See BeVier, supra note 33, at 139.
132
See id. at 139–40.
133
See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 27–30 (arguing that copyright cannot be property
because that would result in too much private power over speech). Rubenfeld assumes
that copyright is private property, such that it would entitle copyright owners to control
others’ speech with little censure from the First Amendment). See id. at 27–30
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It may be, as Tushnet argues, that the mere act of copying
serves valid speech interests.134 Although this can be true in
certain cases, there is no principled way to discern which cases of
copying are speech-related and which are not. Factors such as the
intent of the speaker and the surrounding circumstances are likely
to be highly subjective.135 More importantly, free speech does not
encompass the right to express oneself in a particular way.
Generally speaking, free speech is a negative right in that it
prevents the state from interfering with speech, but it does not
require the state to provide resources for individuals to make
speech in any specific way.136 In other words, the First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to use a particular form of
expression. For example, courts apply low level scrutiny to laws
that regulate the time, place and manner in which speech is made,
reflecting the fact that the First Amendment does not absolutely
protect any one method of speech.137 Even categorical restrictions
may be legitimate if alternate modes of communication are
available. For example, the doctrine of fighting words prevents an
individual from using particularly abusive language to insult
another, but it does not prevent that individual from expressing the
same sentiments using different words or in different
circumstances.138 In the context of copyright, the courts have

134

Tushnet, supra note 16, at 546.
Id. at 568, 574 (arguing that copied works can “feel like the products of the copier’s
own personality and be perceived by others as such,” and that copying a work can “suit
the situation”).
136
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1203 (noting that the First Amendment protects the right
to speak, but does not require the government to subsidize speech).
137
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (emphasizing that the law
only prohibited the individual’s speech at certain times of day). But see Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that the speaker was entitled to use his
particular choice of words to make his expression); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 404 (1989) (holding that flag-burning in protest of the government was protected
speech). These cases can be distinguished on the grounds that the particular form of
expression was inextricably linked to the speaker’s viewpoint, such that prohibiting such
activity would amount to viewpoint discrimination. In contrast, prohibiting the specific
method of copying an existing work does not also penalize the speaker’s viewpoint.
Copying is infringement whether the speaker expresses a positive or negative message.
138
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (noting that a speaker
like Chaplinsky could have uttered his words in the absence of the police officer, or
written down his words instead of vocalizing them). In general, the constitutionality of
135
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commented that the Constitution does not require giving a speaker
the optimal means with which to exercise his speech rights.139 In
this way, copyright’s prohibition against unauthorized
reproduction merely reflects the fact that free speech does not
protect the wholesale copying of a copyrighted work. Assuming
that there are other means of expression available, the First
Amendment does not protect a speaker who chooses the specific
means of copying an existing work to express himself.
The more problematic cases are where a speaker does not
simply reproduce a copyrighted work, but makes his own changes
or additions to the material. Unlike wholesale copying, the speaker
is not merely asserting a right to use a specific, existing means of
expression. Instead, the speaker argues that despite copying a
substantial portion of the original work, he also exercised his right
to free speech and should receive the protection of the First
Amendment.140 In these cases, the copyright owner’s property
interest comes into conflict with the subsequent speaker’s speech
interest. The conflict arises because the speaker wants to use an
existing work for his expressive purposes, but that work is the
exclusive property of another person. In other words, copyright
becomes like a trespass law that prevents a speaker from using
someone else’s property to conduct a political rally. Although the
speaker wishes to use a particular property for his speech, he also
has a genuine speech interest in using that property. As such,
although copyright primarily deals with property rights, there are
instances where copyright effectively restrains the legitimate
speech interests of other speakers. Copyright restricts free speech
because it prohibits the reproduction of an existing work, even if a
speaker makes sufficiently expressive additions or alterations.
While the courts assert that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair
speech restrictions is highly dependent on the surrounding context. See Schenck v. U.S.,
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (setting out the “clear and present danger” test for incitement).
139
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2001) (“Fair use has
never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by
the fair user’s preferred technique or in the format of the original.”). This case was the
appellate court’s decision affirming Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
140
One must copy a substantial portion of the copyrighted work in order for there to be
a finding of copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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use adequately accommodate these concerns, many scholars have
criticized their effectiveness in respecting the right to free
speech.141 Given the vagueness of both doctrines and their failure
to directly address speech interests, they do not sufficiently
safeguard First Amendment interests.
Therefore, although
copyright is property, it can nevertheless restrict the speech
interests of other speakers.
Copyright is a form of general regulation that primarily deals
with property but has incidental effects on speech.142 Copyright
creates a set of property rights for authors and owners to control
and exploit their works. Like ordinary property laws, copyright
does not necessarily restrict the speech interests of others.
However, consistent with its status as property, there are
circumstances where copyright can affect the legitimate speech
interests of other speakers. As with ordinary property, there are
situations where the copyright owner’s property rights conflict
with a subsequent speaker’s right to free speech. Even a neutral
trespass law can have speech consequences when it restrains a
speaker from holding his political rally.143 After all, even as
property, copyright is not immune from the First Amendment.
Characterizing the conflict between copyright and free speech as
being solely about speech is problematic because it is unclear
whether copyright actually enhances or restricts the right to free
speech. Rather, the proper analysis is to weigh the owner’s
property interest against the subsequent speaker’s speech interest.
Therefore, while the courts are correct to treat copyright as a form
of property, they are mistaken to assume that this forecloses the
free speech arguments. As property, copyright remains open to
challenges under the First Amendment.

141

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that
enforcement of a public indecency statute did not violate the First Amendment); City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M. t/b/d/a “Kandyland”, 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (holding that public
indecency statute satisfied the standard for restrictions on symbolic speech).
143
Of course, it may be that the prohibition of the rally is justified. Nonetheless, there
needs to be a balance between the property interest and the speech interest.
142
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B. Copyright is Quasi-Public Property
As discussed above, the courts’ characterization of copyright as
property leads them to conclude that copyright satisfies First
Amendment concerns. Although the courts do not articulate as
much, they seem to assume that copyright is a private property
right belonging to the copyright owner. Certainly, that would
explain why there is virtually no analysis of the constitutionality of
copyright. Since the Constitution only applies to state action, the
actions of private property owners are not subject to the First
Amendment.144 Furthermore, private property is generally not
subject to the public forum doctrine, which requires certain kinds
of property to be available for speech purposes.145 If copyright is
private property, then the constitutional rights of other speakers
have little bearing on its validity.146
Indeed, there is a longstanding perception that copyright is a
form of private property, much like other forms of intellectual
property.147
Copyright assigns property rights to private
individuals who have the personal prerogative to reproduce,
distribute or license their works.148 The state does not dictate how
or under what circumstances a copyright owner must license his
work or exercise any of his other exclusive rights.149 Moreover,
the Copyright Act withholds protection to works created by or
144

See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 19 (1948) (holding that while purely private
conduct was not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts could not use their
power to enforce a covenant which would deny persons their equal protection rights).
145
Courts have applied the First Amendment to private property in one case, but it has
not been followed. See Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (balancing the “Constitutional
rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and
religion”); RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 121 (2003); BeVier, supra note 33, at 122–24 (noting that the First
Amendment empowers the private property owner with the power to exclude).
146
The First Amendment may have some bearing, however, because there are limited
circumstances where the courts have applied the Constitution to private property
interests. See Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 at 13, 19 (1948).
147
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1135
(1990) (discussing fair use as an exception to the “copyright owner’s rights of private
property”).
148
See BeVier, supra note 33, 136–37 (emphasizing that the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution assigns authors rights to reproduce, distribute, and license their works).
149
See id. at 137 (stating that copyright is the institutional decision to assign the
copyright to the private owner).
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commissioned for the government, suggesting that copyright is
meant for private individuals only.150 Both the American and
Canadian courts have characterized copyright as a private right.
For example, the courts have held that copyright is protected by
due process and the just compensation clauses of the Constitution,
in the same way that ordinary property is.151 Similarly, the courts
have viewed fair use as an exception to the copyright owner’s
“private property rights in his expression.”152 Interestingly, there
are also cases where the copyright owner argued that the
government’s use of his copyrighted work violated his private
property rights and amounted to a regulatory taking subject to the
Fifth Amendment.153 In the Canadian context, the court has
explicitly characterized copyright infringement as a form of
trespass onto the copyright owner’s private property.154 Thus,
there is a widely shared belief amongst copyright owners and the
courts that copyright is a form of private property.
However, to treat copyright as private property is to ignore the
underlying purposes of copyright law. Although copyright grants
property rights, they are imbued with a public purpose. By
enacting copyright law, the government grants exclusive rights to
authors in order to increase the number of works available to the

150

See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (“Copyright protection under this title is not available for
any work of the United States Government . . .”); id. § 101 (defining a work of the United
States Government as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States
Government as part of that person’s official duties”). See also Practice Mgmt. Info.
Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that model codes are
“not subject to copyright holder’s exclusive prerogatives”); Veeck v. S. Building Code
Congress Int’l Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that federal agencies adoption
of work as a standard did not render the copyright invalid).
151
See, e.g., Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir 1983) (“An interest in copyright
is a property right protected by the due process and just compensation clause of the
Constitution.”).
152
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986).
153
See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 877 F. Supp. 1386, 1392–
93 (1994) (holding that an “interest in copyright is property interest protected by the due
process clause.”)
154
See Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW, [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶
85 (F.C.T.D.) (Can.) (stating that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not
confer the right to use “private property—the Plaintiff’s copyright—in the service of
freedom of expression”).
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public.155 In other words, copyright is an incentive—the state
gives the owner the statutory protections of copyright in order to
encourage the production and communication of his work to the
public.156 The nature of the copyright owner’s rights is meant to
facilitate the dissemination of his work to society at large. With
the exclusive rights to reproduction and distribution, the owner can
enjoy the profits from the sale of the work and prevent others from
usurping those profits. Likewise, the rights to performance and
display facilitate the presentation of visual or dramatic works to the
public. Even the right of first publication exists for the purpose of
incentivizing the initial public distribution of the work.157
Although a work does not need to be published or made known to
others in order to obtain copyright, copyright has little application
if a work stays completely private.158 It is only when the owner
chooses to disseminate his work to the public that copyright’s
protections become most relevant. In this way, copyright’s
exclusive rights relate to the ways in which an owner makes his
works available to the public.
Further evidence of copyright’s public purpose is found in the
Constitution. The Copyright Clause expressly states that copyright
is meant to promote the “progress of Science and the useful
Arts.”159 The progress of the arts involves creating conditions
whereby authors and owners are encouraged to create works and
communicate them to others.160 To accomplish this purpose,
copyright has chosen the means of giving owners certain exclusive
rights in their works. With the statutory ability to profit from and
control the distribution of their works, copyright encourages
authors to expend their efforts and resources to create more works.
155

This kind of incentive also underlies patent law, in which a limited monopoly is
given to the inventor in order to incentivize his disclosure of the new product.
156
See BeVier, supra note 33, at 112.
157
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002).
158
At the same time, it is true that copyright protection exists regardless of whether or
not an author publishes his work or otherwise makes it public.
159
The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the
exclusive Right to their Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
160
See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (2001) (“The Copyright
Act promotes public access to knowledge because it provides an economic incentive for
authors to publish books and disseminate ideas to the public.”).
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In this way, property rights are a means to an end. Copyright
grants property rights for the ultimate purpose of encouraging the
continual creation of works for the benefit of the public. Indeed,
many scholars have argued that the public purpose of copyright
ought to play a greater role in the understanding of copyright.
Although authors and owners have private rights over their works,
the public has an equally important right to be able to access and
enjoy those works.161 Copyright includes the rights of copyright
owners as well as users.162
The public purpose of copyright is also reflected in the
Copyright Clause’s requirement that copyright be granted to
authors for “limited times.”163 The term “limited times” means
that the period of time in which an owner enjoys copyright’s
privileges must be finite. The purpose of limiting the term is to
prevent owners from having perpetual control over their works.
After the owner has been given a reasonable amount of time to
exploit his work, the work loses copyright protection and falls into
the public domain. In this way, the limited times requirement
ensures that copyrighted works will eventually enter the public
domain where it is available to the public without restrictions.164
Although Congress has continually extended the copyright term
and such extensions have been found to be constitutional, the
courts make it clear that the Constitution requires the copyright
term to have a definite expiry date.165 In this way, the limited
duration of copyright ensures that works will eventually be fully
available to the public.
Given copyright’s public purposes, it is more properly
characterized as quasi-public property. Although authors and
owners possess somewhat private rights over their works, these
rights serve an important public purpose. They are meant to
161

See Craig, supra note 19, at 76 (arguing that copyright should serve the speech
interests of the broader community).
162
See Richard Bronaugh, Peter Barton, & Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View
of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3 (2003).
163
Supra note 159.
164
See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1262 (describing the goal of the Copyright Clause as
ensuring that works enter the public domain after the author’s rights expire).
165
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209–10 (2003) (noting that regime of perpetual
copyrights was not included in any of the copyright acts).
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encourage the creation and dissemination of works for the benefit
of the public. Unlike rights in real property, which have roots in
natural law and the structure of government, copyright is a
statutory creation imbued with a specific purpose.166 The
copyright owner’s rights owe their existence to the Copyright Act
and are governed entirely by that statute.167 Thus, copyright must
be interpreted in light of the statute’s purposes. Copyright does not
give property rights to authors and owners for their own sake, but
for the overarching goal of furthering the progress of the arts. Of
course, copyright is not purely public property. Public property
usually consists of property owned by the government or private
individuals that is generally accessible to the public.168 Although
the state can regulate public property, in general it cannot exclude
others from making reasonable uses of the property.169 In contrast,
copyright is more exclusive in that the owner can control the ways
in which his work is used or deny its use altogether.170 However,
the private aspects of the owner’s rights must be moderated by the
public purposes of copyright. Since the owner’s rights are
statutory creations, they must adhere to the legislative purposes for
copyright. Therefore, since copyright has both private and public
aspects, it is best viewed as a form of quasi-public property.
In this light, the doctrines of the idea/expression dichotomy and
fair use can be understood as ways of ensuring that the public
benefits from copyrighted works. The idea/expression dichotomy
establishes that the expression in the work belongs exclusively to
166

See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. 5 (1689)
(treating property as a natural right that flows from a person mixing his labour with
nature). Property rights are also explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution—“[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
167
GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 4, at 6 (stating that the courts have found that
copyright does not exist at common law and is entirely a creation of Congress).
168
Shopping malls are an example of privately owned property that could be considered
public property.
169
See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113–14 (describing how public forums
are subject only to content-neutral regulation).
170
For a discussion about the consequences when copyright owners fail to license the
use of their works, see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(1982); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use and Efficiency in
Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991).
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the copyright owner, but the ideas are available to the public.171
Others are free to borrow the ideas contained in the copyrighted
work because they are not protected by copyright. Although the
distinction between ideas and expression is notoriously vague, the
doctrine nevertheless ensures that with every copyrighted work,
there are ideas in it that are free for the public to use and borrow
from.172 Similarly, the fair use defense is not only a safety valve
for free speech, but a way to allow the public to use copyrighted
works in productive ways.173 The enumerated fair use categories
of criticism, review, commentary and news reporting are all
endeavors that are particularly useful to the public.174 Apart from
an author’s personal speech interest in writing a movie review, for
example, the public benefits from the information and opinions
contained in the article. Fair use does not simply defend against
copyright’s encroachments on speech, but actively promotes those
uses of copyrighted works that are beneficial to society. Thus,
these doctrines help serve copyright’s purpose of increasing the
availability of works to the public.
It could be argued that copyright is exclusively private property
because the state assigns copyright to private individuals. Instead
of creating a state-owned or state-monitored system whereby the
government owns and controls copyrighted works, the Copyright
Act confers copyright and its exclusive rights on parties in their
private capacity.175 Indeed, in Michelin the court explicitly refused
to treat copyright as quasi-public property.176 The court reasoned
171

See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879); see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (outlining Judge Learned Hand’s oft-quoted
statement about how to discern a work’s idea from its expression).
172
See Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (2001) (describing how
the idea/expression dichotomy “embodies the First Amendment’s underlying goal of
encouraging open debate and the free exchange of ideas”).
173
Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a Proposal for its Application to
Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 983 (2006) (describing fair use as a safety valve
that avoids overly “rigid application of the copyright statute” (quoting Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990))). The safety valve rationale also underlies the freedom of
speech. See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1188 (discussing a balancing of the interests of the
creator and the interests of free speech).
174
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing that the purposes of criticism, comments,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research can be shielded by fair use).
175
See BeVier, supra note 33, at 107–08, 113.
176
Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW, [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (Can.).
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that the existence of a state-sanctioned copyright system did not
render it public.177 Although the court did not elaborate, it seemed
to accept that copyright is private property because it is owned by
private individuals.178 However, the fact that copyright belongs to
individuals does not diminish the fact that it is a statutory creation
with a public purpose. The Copyright Act defines the owner’s
rights and their meaning must be interpreted in light of the statute’s
goals.179 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s own declaration that
copyright is the “engine of free expression” belies its inextricable
link to a public purpose.180 Copyright is an institution that is
meant to further the basic values of the First Amendment—that is,
the creation and distribution of speech to the general public.181
Thus, although copyright grants rights to private individuals, it
must incorporate the public goals of copyright law in order to be
consistent with its own statutory grant.182 In this way, copyright is
distinguishable from ordinary property laws because the state does
not encourage property owners to make their property available to
the public. Rather, property rights are granted for the purpose of
simply allocating ownership of a scarce resource and encouraging
the beneficial use of property.183
Furthermore, it is inaccurate to suggest that copyright is private
property simply because it is the copyright owner who possesses
the right.184
The identity of the property owner is not
determinative of whether the property is public or private. For
example, the government owns many properties that would not be
regarded as public. The Oval Office or judges’ chambers are
properties that are owned by the state, but their function and
177

Id. at ¶ 102. The court stated that copyright’s registration under a state-formulated
system did not diminish the private nature of copyright. But see, Craig, supra note 19, at
95 (stating that a lower court was overstepping its bounds by declaring copyright to be a
form of private property).
178
Cie générale des établissements Michelin v. CAW, [1996] 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, ¶ 102
(Can.).
179
See Craig, supra note 19, at 95 (noting that copyright is statutory law and therefore
legislation must respect its statutory purposes as well as Charter values).
180
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
181
Craig, supra note 19, at 108–10.
182
Id. at 113.
183
See BeVier, supra note 33, at 112–13.
184
See id. at 137.
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purpose make them essentially private places.185 These examples
suggest that the purposes to which a property is put to influence
whether it is public or private. Moreover, unlike private property
laws, copyright contains its own exceptions for public uses.
Through the doctrine of fair use, the state requires copyrighted
property to accommodate other individuals’ interests. A book
reviewer may borrow from the book as long as it satisfies the
conditions for fair use. The Copyright Act also contains numerous
exceptions for libraries, archives, and educational institutions
which use copyrighted works for public purposes.186 Therefore, it
does not matter that the state does not own copyright or control a
copyright owner’s use of his property. The public nature of
copyright derives from the statute’s public purposes, irrespective
of to whom the rights are assigned. At the same time, it is true that
copyright grants its property rights to private individuals who have
substantial control over how that property is used. Given the coexistence of these public and private features, copyright ought to
be viewed as quasi-public property.
C. Re-Characterizing the Conflict as Between Property
and Speech
Treating copyright as property clarifies the conflict between
copyright and speech. When copyright is viewed as speech
regulation, there is an inevitable stalemate between the speech
rights of the author and the subsequent speaker. Both parties can
claim a right to free speech, and the First Amendment does not
provide a clear basis for determining whose claim should
prevail.187 This is exacerbated by the fact that copyright’s benefits
and burdens do not necessarily fall on any particular group of
speakers. Copyright owners can also be subsequent speakers, and
vice versa.188 Given the ease of obtaining copyright and the wide
185

See generally WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113.
See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (subject to certain conditions, “it is not an infringement of
copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting within the scope of
their employment, to reproduce no more than one copy or phonorecord of a work”).
187
See supra note 181 and accompanying text. The analysis is particularly complex
when copyright claims to have already accommodated others’ speech rights. See
McGowan, supra note 42, at 332–33.
188
See McGowan, supra note 42, at 301.
186
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availability of copyrighted works, there is little difficulty for an
individual to be both a copyright owner and someone who borrows
from other people’s works. As such, it is not clear whether
copyright prefers one speaker’s interests over another’s.
Moreover, when copyright is regarded as speech regulation, it
possesses an internal logic that is somewhat inconsistent. It seems
contradictory for copyright to claim that it can enhance speech
overall by restricting the speech of some. In general, courts are
highly skeptical of arguments that the freedom of speech can be
served by limiting some kinds of speech.189 Therefore, treating
copyright as speech regulation makes it difficult to determine
whether copyright strikes the right balance between the speech
interests on both sides.
On the other hand, if copyright is treated as property, there is
no need to resolve this conundrum. The courts weigh the
copyright owner’s property interest against the conceptually
separate speech interest of the defendant. The conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment is a clash between property
and speech, instead of between the speech rights of different
parties. In this way, the courts do not need to decide whose speech
interest they want to favor and whose speech interest they are
consequently disfavoring. Instead, they can simply determine
whether the copyright owner’s property interest justifies the
infringement on the defendant’s speech rights.
At the same time, copyright is not a private property right that
is completely immune from the Constitution. Given the public
purposes of copyright law, the property rights of authors and
owners are meant to facilitate the greater volume and availability
of speech to the general public. Since copyright is a quasi-property
interest, it must be evaluated for whether it adequately
accommodates the speech interests of others.

189
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding in part that limiting
independent political expenditures and fixing a ceiling on campaign expenditures is
unconstitutional as impermissibly burdening the right of free expression); Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 297 (1996) (holding in part that
a provision permitting the operator of a public access channel to prohibit patently
offensive or indecent programming violates the First Amendment).
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III. COPYRIGHT & THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
If copyright is quasi-public property, how must it
accommodate the right to free speech? One way of answering this
question is to analogize copyright to a public forum that must meet
First Amendment standards.
There is a well-developed
jurisprudence dealing with the constitutional right to use public
forums for expressive purposes.190 Free speech is primarily a
negative right to be free from governmental interference.191 It does
not necessarily grant individuals the right to access places or
resources in order to make speech.192 Nonetheless, the courts have
recognized that in order for free speech to be a meaningful right,
some places or venues must be available to the public for speech
purposes. Accordingly, the courts have considered different kinds
of public forums and what kinds of speech restrictions may
justifiably be placed on these places.
If copyright is a public forum, then the conflict between
copyright and free speech is between the copyright owner’s
property rights and the subsequent speaker’s interest in using the
copyrighted work as a forum. The conflict arises because a
speaker wishes to use an existing work as a forum for his speech,
but that forum is property that belongs to the copyright owner. In
this way, the tension between copyright and free speech does not
pit the speech interests of one person against another’s, but deals
with the more familiar First Amendment question of whether a
forum ought to accommodate the kind of speech that the defendant
wants to make.
A. Overview of the Public Forum Doctrine in the U.S. & Canada
The First Amendment recognizes that individuals have a right
to use public forums for speech purposes and limits the
government’s ability to regulate these places. The term “public

190
See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1965).
191
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
192
Nimmer, supra note 23, at 1203 (“The First Amendment guarantees the right to
speak; it does not offer a governmental subsidy for the speaker, and particularly a subsidy
at the expense of authors whose well-being is also a matter of public interest.”).
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forum” refers to property that is, for the most part, open to the
public to use for speech.193 In the United States, the courts
distinguish between three kinds of forums: traditional public
forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums.
Traditional public forums are those places that are historically
viewed as being open to the public, such as streets, sidewalks and
parks.194 Designated public forums refer to places that are not
traditionally open to the public, but have been designated by the
state to be used for speech or assembly purposes.195 For example,
the government may open up a school auditorium for the purpose
of holding a town hall meeting. Nonpublic forums include
government-owned property that is closed to the expressive
activities of the general public, such as courtrooms or the Oval
Office.196 The existence of nonpublic forums reflects the fact that
not all public property must serve as a forum for speech. With
regards to private property, the public forum doctrine generally
does not apply.197 Since the Constitution only applies to state
action, property belonging to private parties is not subject to the
First Amendment.198
In public forums, the government may regulate speech only if
there is a compelling state objective and the means chosen is

193

See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113.
See Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and . . . for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”).
195
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(defining designated public forums as those where the state opens property “for use by
the public as a place for expressive activity”).
196
See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 113. Other examples include jails and
teachers’ mailboxes. Id.
197
Id. at 121.
198
See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). While this is true, as a general
matter, there have been cases that suggested there is a right to use private property for
speech purposes. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (holding that when owners sufficiently open
up their property to the public their First Amendment rights will apply). Lloyd Corp., 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
194
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narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.199 Generally speaking,
the regulations must be content-neutral and leave open alternate
methods of communication.200 For example, a law that restricts the
times of day or the volume of speech in a public park is justified in
the interests of protecting citizens from unwanted noise, but a
wholesale prohibition of distributing leaflets is not a justified
means of controlling litter.201 Thus, these cases demonstrate that
while public forums are available for a wide variety of speech
purposes, it is permissible for the government to impose minimal
restrictions for non-speech related reasons where there are ample
alternate means of expression available. These regulations are
often referred to as “time, place, and manner” regulations because
they merely govern the form of expression, as opposed to its
content or viewpoint.202
The Canadian courts take a different approach in their public
forum analysis.203 In the seminal case of Committee for the
Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, a divided Supreme Court
articulated three different ways to determine the availability of
public places for expressive purposes.204 This case involved the
members of a political group who distributed leaflets at a public
airport.205 The group claimed they had a right to use the airport as
a forum for their expression.206 Writing for three members of the
199

Perry Education Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. In other words, the applicable standard of
scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny. For a discussion of the intermediate scrutiny standard,
see supra note 38.
200
See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 116.
201
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (upholding a municipal regulation
requiring performers to use certain sound equipment and technicians for concert in New
York City’s Central Park); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (invalidating an
ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills on public streets because it restricted the
right to free speech more than necessary to control litter).
202
See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
203
The American courts’ categorical approach to public forums has been criticized as
being overly rigid and placing undue emphasis on physical places instead of the free
speech values at stake. See C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum:
Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986); see also
Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, ¶ 9 (Can.) (Lamer J.
explicitly declining to follow the American public forum jurisprudence).
204
Comm. for the Commonwealth, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (Can.).
205
Id. ¶ 52.
206
Id. ¶ 53.
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Court, Justice Lamer held that the freedom of expression does not
grant an unqualified right to use public forums for speech.207 An
individual has a right to communicate in a public forum only
where his communication is compatible with the principal function
of that place.208 For example, a speaker has no right to shout
political messages in a library, but may wear a t-shirt bearing those
messages.209 In contrast, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé emphasized that
the freedom of expression encompasses a right to use public
property for speech and any restrictions must be justified under § 1
of the Charter, the limitations clause.210 Accordingly, the right to
use government property for speech involves a consideration of
various factors, such as the traditional status of the place, whether
the public is ordinarily admitted, and the compatibility of the place
with the expression.211 Under this approach, the courts balance the
individual’s speech interest against the government’s interest to
determine if there is a right to access a particular forum.212 Lastly,
Justice McLachlin’s opinion struck a middle ground. While she
agreed that the freedom of expression did not confer an absolute
right to use government property, the degree to which a forum is
available to the public depends on whether the expression is tied to
one of the underlying values for expression.213 When the speakers’
use of the forum is related to the attainment of truth, political
participation, or individual self-fulfillment, they have a claim to
access government property for its expression.214
Thus, the foregoing summary of U.S. and Canadian public
forum doctrine outlines several different approaches to
determining the extent to which public property must be available
to the public for speech purposes. The courts consider a variety of
criteria, including the traditional or designated function of a place,
its compatibility with speech, and the underlying speech values at

207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 114.
Id. ¶ 148.
See id. ¶¶150–56.
Id. ¶ 243.
Id. ¶¶ 243–44.
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stake. All of these considerations can help determine how
copyright ought to accommodate the speech interests of others.
B. Copyright as a Public Forum
How is copyright a public forum? If copyright creates property
rights in intangible expression, and these rights serve a public
purpose, the copyrighted work can be conceived of as an
incorporeal space containing ideas and expression.
Every
copyrighted work consists of expressive property owned by the
copyright owner, and expression or ideas that are available to the
public. By enacting the Copyright Act, the state sanctions the
creation of forums in which both copyright owners and the public
have an interest. These copyright forums serve many expressive
purposes. First, the forum provides copyrighted works to the
public. As discussed above, copyright grants exclusive rights to
authors and owners in order to encourage them to distribute and
disseminate their works to others.215 With copyright’s protections,
authors and owners can allow the public to enjoy their works
without the fear of misappropriation or the loss of control over
their works. Second, the copyright forum allows others to use and
access copyrighted works. Individuals can read books and enjoy
music as part of their First Amendment rights to access literature,
the arts, and other materials that lead to a more informed and
enlightened citizenry.216 Third, and most importantly, the forum
allows owners and users to share copyrighted works amongst
themselves. Although copyright owners have exclusive rights over
the copyrighted expression, the unprotected ideas are available to
subsequent speakers for expressive purposes. And, although the
expression is the exclusive property of the copyright owner, the
fair use doctrine requires that it be made available to other
speakers for certain purposes that are beneficial to the public. In
all these ways, copyright acts as an intangible public forum that
serves many speech-related purposes.

215

See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 246.
216
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Indeed, the courts acknowledge that public forums need not be
tangible places. In Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, a religious publication was denied funding
from a university fund that subsidized the costs of student
publications.217 This was challenged as being unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.218 The
Court described the university’s student publication fund as a
forum that was “metaphysical” rather than “spatial or
geographic.”219 Nevertheless, the rules governing public forums
applied.220 Since the university created the fund in order to
facilitate student speech, the fund was an intangible public
forum.221
Similarly, copyright is an incorporeal forum that owes its
existence to state action. Through the Copyright Act, the state has
created a system of entitlements for copyright owners that
encourages them to disseminate their work to the public and
ensures that the public can enjoy these works. Unlike the fund in
Rosenberger, the government’s grant of copyright protection does
not directly subsidize authors’ speech but uses the more indirect
means of granting property rights to authors and owners.
Nevertheless, these property rights perform the same function as
the university fund—they incentivize the creation of speech and its
availability to the general public.
Hence, copyright is analogous to a traditional or designated
public forum because copyrighted property is meant to serve a
distinct public purpose. Although the courts have not recognized
copyright as a traditional public forum, it has many of the same
characteristics. The courts describe traditional forums as those that
are “immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the public” and
whose use forms part of the rights and liberties of citizens.222
Likewise, copyright has a longstanding history in English law
which, through the adoption of the Statute of Anne in 1710,
217
218
219
220
221
222

515 U.S. 819, 824, 830 (1995).
Id. at 827.
Id.
Id. at 830.
See id.
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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created copyright law to protect authors and make their works
accessible to the public.223 In 1776, the U.S. Constitution formally
adopted this notion of copyright and expressly gave the federal
government the power to enact the Copyright Act.224 This statute
reflects many of the principles that are found in the original Statute
of Anne.225 Thus, copyright has an extensive history of facilitating
speech that dates back to the adoption of the Constitution, as well
as the common law and English statutes that preceded it.
Copyright has the historical underpinnings of a right that has long
been recognized as a way of facilitating speech. Moreover, the
definition of traditional public forums should not be static but
ought to embrace new places that play the same role as traditional
forums.226 Just as streets for automobile traffic were not envisaged
at “time immemorial,” copyright can qualify as a traditional public
forum even though it did not fall under the original definition. The
Internet is an example of new technology that functions as a public
forum because it provides an arena for speech and communication
that is open and easily accessible. Indeed, the courts’ recognition
of parks and sidewalks as traditional forums is itself relatively
recent.227
Therefore, although the courts have not treated
copyright as a traditional public forum in the past, there is no
principled reason why they cannot begin to do so.
Even if copyright is not a traditional public forum, it qualifies
as a designated public forum. The cases indicate that the key
factor in determining whether a place is a designated public forum
is the government’s intention.228 By enacting the Copyright Act,
the state expressly created a property regime to fulfill the public
purpose of promoting the progress of the arts. Congress’
223

See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 4, at 2–3; see also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Statute of Anne was [meant]
to encourage creativity and ensure that the public would have free access to
information.”).
224
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
225
See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 4, at 4–5.
226
But see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205–06 (2003) (holding
that “doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations
where such history is lacking” such as the Internet).
227
See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 114.
228
See id. at 118; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
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legislative action in creating a comprehensive copyright scheme
demonstrates a clear intention to create a forum that facilitates
speech. Although a state is not bound to create a designated forum
nor keep it open indefinitely, during the period in which the
property is open to speech it is treated as though it was a traditional
public forum.229 Thus, once the state decided to create copyright
law, it can be treated like any other public forum for the duration
of its existence. Moreover, the government’s purposes help define
the nature and extent to which the forum has been designated for
speech purposes. As argued above, there is a close connection
between copyright and its public purposes. The nature of owners’
rights is such that copyrighted works are meant to be distributed
and disseminated to the public. Therefore, the copyright forum
was created for the purpose of making works available to others.
In addition, Congress’ decision to make copyright widely available
indicates its intention to expand the breadth of the forum in which
speech is to be accommodated. By giving copyright protection to a
wide range of owners and works, copyright seeks to widen the
forum in which the public can engage. Therefore, copyright law
creates a designated forum that is meant to facilitate a broad range
of speech and a wide right of public access.
An obvious example of the forum-like nature of copyright is
the concept of the public domain.230 The works in the public
domain consist of those whose copyright protection has expired or
could not receive copyright in the first place. Within this domain,
a vast array of expressive material, including Shakespearean plays
and his plot device of star-crossed lovers are available for public
use, without any of copyright’s constraints.231 The public domain
is essentially the intangible equivalent of public forums. The
public can make use of works in the public domain as freely as
they can take to the streets for speech. Like sidewalks and parks,
229

See WEAVER & LIVELY, supra note 145, at 118.
See Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 597, 598 (2007); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright,
and Free Speech: Some Tentative Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First
Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Law, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 17, 27
(2003).
231
There remains the possibility of non-copyright-related constraints, such as privacy,
defamation, or the right to publicity.
230
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the public domain is not owned by anyone but is collectively
owned by the public.232 Most importantly, they serve a similar
purpose: they ensure that there is space, both physically and
metaphysically, for people to make speech and communicate it to
others.
In this way, the public domain fulfills the First
Amendment promise of having places available for free speech,
just as public forums do.
However, the analogy is not limited to the public domain. All
works, whether copyrighted or uncopyrighted, have the potential to
be used as a venue for speech, and all works, whether copyrighted
or uncopyrighted, are subject to the First Amendment. As argued
above, copyrighted works are quasi-public property and the extent
to which they must be available to the public depends on an
evaluation of the copyright owner’s property interest and the
public’s speech rights. Uncopyrighted works in the public domain
are true public forums—completely public property that is freely
accessible to the public and unconstrained by copyright’s property
regime. In other words, the public domain is a good example of
how copyright is a public forum, but the analogy applies to all of
copyright.
C. How Copyright Measures Up as a Public Forum
Generally speaking, copyright is consistent with the public
forum doctrine. Under the First Amendment, time, place and
manner regulations can apply to speech in public forums if there
are ample alternatives for communication.233 By prohibiting the
wholesale reproduction of copyrighted works, copyright only
prohibits a specific manner of expression. The speaker is free to
borrow small portions of the copyrighted work or create a similar
message using uncopyrighted expression. Thus, the speaker has
many alternative ways to express his idea. Moreover, copyright’s
232

Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (holding that public
forums are property being “held in trust for the use of the public.”). See also Julie Cohen,
Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 124–66 (L. Guibault & P.B. Hugenholtz eds. 2006)
(comparing the public domain to a “cultural landscape” whereby people can use material
in creative ways).
233
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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prohibition of copying is not directed against the content of the
defendant’s speech. Since copyright penalizes a reproduction for
its physical similarity to the original work, the restriction does not
depend on understanding the meaning of the copied defendant’s
speech.234 In addition, the purpose of copyright is unrelated to the
suppression of speech. Copyright’s prohibition of unauthorized
reproduction is meant to protect the property rights of authors and
owners. By enforcing these property rights, copyright seeks to
incentivize the future creation of copyrighted works, not to restrict
the speech of others. Therefore, in its overall scheme, copyright
imposes narrow and acceptable limits on expression that uses
copyrighted property.
However, as discussed above, copyright’s constitutionality is
less clear in the case of non-verbatim copying.235 While
copyright’s penalizing of such speech remains unrelated to the
suppression of speech and its content, there are cases where the
defendant may have few alternatives for expression. Parodies
provide an illuminating example. By definition, a parody is a work
that mimics the original in order to convey a different, often
critical message.236 A parodist quotes from an existing work in
order to criticize the work itself.237 The courts have recognized
that a parodist must be able to borrow enough to conjure up the
original work and may borrow further material if it is
reasonable.238 In this way, there is a clear need for a parodist to be
able to use the original work. In fact, the original work is
indispensable to the parodist because the sheer existence of the
parody depends on the use of the work. In other words, the only
means of creating a parody is to borrow from an existing work.
The parodist does not have the alternative of using a different or
234

Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 48–49.
See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
236
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994).
237
Id. at 569–70 (“[T]he heart of any parodist’s claim . . . is the use of some elements of
a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author’s works.”).
238
Id. at 588 (“Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much more is
reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s overriding purpose and
character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve
as market substitute for the original.”).
235

LIU_121307_FINAL

2008]

12/13/2007 10:08:55 PM

COPYRIGHT AS QUASI-PUBLIC PROPERTY

433

uncopyrighted work because the nature of the genre compels the
use of the original work. Therefore, if copyright prohibits a
parody, it is likely to fail the constitutional requirement of leaving
alternative means of expression available. Given the very nature
of parodies, there is only one way of creating a parody and that is
to borrow from the original work.
At the same time, this does not mean that the parodist has
license to commit copyright infringement.239 It is possible for a
parodist to borrow from the original work without taking so much
expression that would constitute infringement. Since copyright is
quasi-public property, there are portions of the property (for
instance, the ideas) that are available to the public to use. Although
the parodist has a speech interest to create his parody, his interest
must be weighed against the copyright owner’s property interest.
But since the nature of parody is such that the parodist can only
express himself through a single means—that is, by borrowing
from the copyrighted work—the First Amendment suggests that
the speech interest ought to prevail.
Many scholars argue that if parodies can justify copyright
infringement, then so should satires.240 A satire uses an existing
work to mock or ridicule something other than the work itself, such
as politics or societal norms.241 Like parodies, satires often convey
a transformative, critical message that reflects the genuine speech
interests of the speaker. However, in terms of property interests,
copyright’s restriction against satires is justified. Copyright
prohibits a satirist from copying an existing work, but leaves open
numerous means of communication. Unlike a parodist, a satirist
does not necessarily have to use a particular work to create his
satire, but can choose from an array of works that are conducive to
his satirical purposes. For example, an author who wants to
ridicule the O.J. Simpson trial using well-known children’s stories
can choose between the copyrighted books of Dr. Seuss or

239

See id. at 581.
Michael C. Albin, Beyond Fair Use: Putting Satire in its Proper Place, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 518 (1985); Adriana Collado, Note, Unfair Use: The Lack of Fair Use Protection
for Satire Under § 107 of the Copyright Act, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 65 (2004).
241
See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 500 (2d ed. 1989).
240
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traditional fairy tales that belong in the public domain.242 In fact,
the author is not barred from borrowing elements from the Dr.
Seuss books as long as he does not copy a substantial part of the
copyrighted expression.243 As such, the prohibition against
satirists’ copyright infringement meets constitutional scrutiny
because the speaker has alternative modes of expression. The
copyright owner’s property rights prevail over the satirists’ speech
rights because there is no compelling reason why the satirist must
use a particular piece of property to make his speech. Since the
First Amendment does not guarantee that a speaker can use his
selected means of expression, satires do not deserve special
treatment under copyright law.
Furthermore, the public forum doctrine provides that the
interest behind the regulation must be unrelated to the suppression
of speech. Since copyright confers property rights for the purpose
of promoting the creation of works, copyright generally has a
speech-enhancing purpose. However, copyright owners can utilize
copyright to suppress speech. In Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin
Company, the likely reason why the copyright owner sued the
defendant for copyright infringement was because the owner
disapproved of the defendant’s message.244 This is because the
copyright owner had a practice of censoring other authors’ use of
its work so that they would not “write anything about
miscegenation or homosexuality.”245 Additionally, there was little
evidence that the defendant’s work had any adverse economic
impact on the original.246 Since the owner appeared to be
motivated to suppress the defendant’s speech, it was proper for the
court to favor a finding of fair use. Although copyright is usually
speech-neutral, as applied by the copyright owner in Suntrust, it
242

See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (1997) (granting a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the publication and distribution of a book that
recounted the story of the O.J. Simpson trial in the style of Dr. Seuss).
243
See id. at 1398.
244
268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001).
245
See id.
246
Id. at 1276. Judge Marcus in his concurring opinion noted that this gave the
subversive nature of Randall’s novel additional relevance. Id. at 1282. For an interesting
discussion of the Suntrust case in terms of copyright’s treatment of sexualized works, see
Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U.J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 273, 294–300 (2007).
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restricted another person’s speech based on its content. In other
words, Suntrust did not use copyright in accordance with its
normal purposes, but used it for the specific purpose of censoring
the defendant’s speech. Moreover, the fact that the defendant
prevailed in this case indicates that copyright is not a purely
private right. Ordinarily, a private property owner is entitled to
exclude others if he disapproves of the content of their speech. A
homeowner has the prerogative to prevent a pro-choice rally from
occurring on his lawn without violating the First Amendment. Yet
the court implicitly accepts that copyright has a public dimension
when it recognized the defendant’s speech interest in Suntrust.
The court assumed that copyright is meant to serve public purposes
and therefore should not be used to infringe the defendant’s
legitimate speech interests.247 By preventing a copyright owner
from using copyright to suppress speech, the court implicitly
recognized the public nature of copyright and how it is subject to
the First Amendment.
The Canadian public forum jurisprudence provides further
guidance for how copyright ought to accommodate free speech.
Justice Lamer’s approach in Committee for the Commonwealth
emphasized the compatibility between expression and a particular
forum.248 A speaker has the right to use a public place if his
speech is compatible with the function of that place. The notion of
compatibility cannot refer to the property owner’s approval of the
other speaker’s message, or whether the original work was
intended to be used in these new ways. This would turn copyright
into a tool of viewpoint discrimination that would be clearly
unjustified under the First Amendment and the Charter’s freedom
of expression.249 Instead, compatibility refers to a functional
analysis that turns on whether the speaker’s use of the property
would impair the integrity of the property’s function. In other
words, speech is compatible if it does not threaten the property
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Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1260–61.
Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (Can.).
249
To borrow Justice Lamer’s example, it would not make sense if a librarian could
prohibit a speaker from wearing a political t-shirt in a library if the librarian did not
support those political views. Id. at ¶ 18.
248
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owner’s ability to exercise his property rights.250 Copyright
incorporates this notion of compatibility through the statutory
defense of fair use. For example, fair use considers the impact of
the defendant’s work on the market for the original.251 If the
defendant’s work is an effective market substitute for the original,
then it is likely that the owner’s rights over his work have been
compromised. With a substitute in the market, the owner cannot
profit from the reproduction and distribution of his work.
Conversely, if the defendant’s work does not affect the market for
the original, it is likely that the copyright owner retains the ability
to exercise his exclusive rights. Therefore, the market impact
factor assesses compatibility because it looks at whether the
defendant’s use has impaired the copyright owner’s ability to enjoy
his exclusive rights. Market impact is important not because it is
relevant to free speech, but because it is relevant to the owner’s
property rights. Indeed, the economic effect of speech is not
usually considered in the First Amendment analysis.252 However,
it is relevant in the context of copyright because the owner’s
interest relates to the economic exploitation of his work in the
market.
In this way, the market impact consideration
accommodates speech concerns by only disfavoring expression
that is not compatible with the copyright owner’s economic rights.
Similarly, fair use’s consideration of a work’s
transformativeness recognizes the potential speech interests of the
defendant. By focusing on the ways in which the infringing work
is different from the original, fair use pays attention to whether the
defendant exercised his right to free speech. This is not to say that
a speaker must say something new or original in order to gain the
First Amendment’s protections. Rather, the transformative nature
250

See id. at 22.
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2007). Section 107 provides that fair use is evaluated according
to “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.” Id. The Canadian Copyright Act considers similar
criteria under its fair dealing exception. Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 29
(1985) (excepting research or private study, criticism or review, news reporting, acts
undertaken without motive or gain, and educational instruction or examination).
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See McGowan, supra note 42, at 334–35.
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of the defendant’s work helps indicate whether he was merely
appropriating the owner’s property or whether he had genuine
speech interests. When a speaker uses another person’s property
for expressive purposes, he does not simply use the property
without doing anything more. A person who enters another
person’s property does not exercise any obvious speech interest
unless he also does something else, like wave a placard or shout a
political slogan. The need for the speaker to do something more
than just use the property is necessary in order to discern an
expressive purpose. In the case of copyrighted property, it is not
satisfactory for a speaker to simply reproduce the work. The
speaker must contribute expression of his own in order to
demonstrate a speech-related purpose.
In this way, the
transformative factor of the fair use defense helps to determine
whether there is a genuine speech interest in play. Therefore, as a
general matter, the fair use doctrine helps to attain an appropriate
balance between the copyright owner’s property interest and the
defendant’s speech interest. Through the four statutory factors,
fair use extends protection to works that represent genuine
expressive interests and are compatible with the owner’s property
rights.
This analysis makes it clear that Michelin was wrongly
decided.253 In that case, the union’s use of the Michelin Tire Man
did not impair the copyright owner’s property rights. For one
thing, the union did not use the copyrighted work for economic
purposes. It used the Michelin Tire Man in order to recruit
employees to its organization, not to profit directly from its use of
the copyrighted work. Although the union may have had a
financial incentive to recruit new members, it did not thwart the
copyright owner’s right to exploit its work. The Michelin
corporation is still able to use its logo to advertise its products and
to represent its company image. Therefore, the union’s use was
compatible with the function of the copyrighted work. In addition,
the union used the Michelin Tire Man in a parodic way. The
leaflets used the company logo in order to ridicule the logo itself.
Unless there is a blanket prohibition on parodies, it is necessary to
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See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text.
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borrow from an existing work in order to parody it. However, the
use of copyrighted logos can be problematic because they are
usually short, indivisible works from which a parodist is likely to
copy the entire work in order to parody it. Parody’s implications
for copyrighted logos are beyond the scope of this Article, but the
union’s parodic purposes do raise significant free speech concerns
in this case. Further, it is evident that the union exercised its right
to free speech. By altering the Michelin Tire Man to convey an
entirely different message, the union copied the work in a
transformative way. Unlike a wholesale copier, the union
exhibited significant expression of its own to raise genuine speech
concerns. Therefore, the court was mistaken to brush aside the
constitutional challenges and should have considered whether the
copyright owner’s property rights justified the infringement on the
union’s speech rights.
Lastly, the Michelin case illustrates another way in which
copyright ought to accommodate the speech interests of others.
The Canadian jurisprudence recognizes that there is a particularly
powerful claim to use a forum for speech purposes where there is a
connection to one of the underlying values of free speech. Justice
McLachlin’s opinion in Committee for the Commonwealth254
focused on the link between the use of the forum and the three
main goals of freedom of expression. If the defendant’s speech in
a particular place is related to political or democratic participation,
the attainment of truth, or individual autonomy, the forum may
need to accommodate that speech. In Michelin, the union’s
activity served several speech-related values—it expressed the
union’s position against the Michelin corporation and it facilitated
the ability of employees to associate with the union. In other
words, the union’s use of the copyrighted logo was tied to
important political and democratic values in being able to express
criticism and solidarity within a labor union. In particular,
Michelin’s context of union activity provides a particularly
compelling reason to view the speech interests in terms of its farreaching implications on democratic and social values.
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Comm. for the Commonwealth v. Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (Can.).
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CONCLUSION
The conflict between copyright and free speech needs a new
approach. The existing debate is mired in a contradictory
argument about whether copyright enhances or restricts speech.
Meanwhile, the courts seem to assume that copyright is property
and copyright is therefore largely immunized from speech
concerns. Both of these premises are false; copyright is about
property rights, not speech regulation. Yet, even as property,
copyright is subject to the First Amendment. Since copyright is
not private property, but quasi-public property that facilitates the
availability of works to the public, copyright needs to
accommodate the speech interests of others. There is a conflict
between the copyright and speech, but the conflict needs to be
analyzed in terms of the copyright owner’s property interest versus
the other party’s speech interest. It is only by viewing the conflict
in terms of copyright’s status as property that the values behind
copyright and speech can be fully understood and respected.

